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Saturday, January 12, 2008

Amar Chandra Vs. Excise Collector, Tripura-AIR 1972 SC 1863

Where there was prohibition on importation of' arms, ammunition, or gun powder or any other goods', the words 'any other goods' were construed as referring to goods similar to 'arms, ammunition or gun powder' (A.G. Vs. Brown (1920), 1 KB 773).
Jii)1( the particular words used e~~the ~hole g~~s (cate&.ory), then the general words are to be construed as covering a larger genus.
We must note, however, that the general principle of 'ejusdem generis' applies only where the specific words are all of the same nature. When they are of different categories, then the meaning of the general words following those specific words remains unaffected-those general words then would not take colour from the earlier specific words.
In Amar Chandra Vs. Excise Collector, Tripura-AIR 1972 SC 1863, it was observed that the doctrine is applicable when (i) the statute contains an enumeration of specific words, (ii) the subjects of the enumeration constitute a class or category, (iii) that class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration, (iv) the general term follows the enumeration, and (v) there is no indication of a different legislative intent-quoted with approval in Housing Board of Haryana Vs. Haryana Housing Board Employees Union-(1996) 1 SCC 95-where it was observed that if three is no 'genus' and if collection of items are 'heterogeneous', the rule does not apply.
In other words, general words following particular or specific words should
confine to things of same kind. This is termed 'Ejusdem Generis'.
This is on the assumption that the general words are inserted in case something which
ought to have been included among the specifically enumerated items had been omitted.
In Vikas Enterprises Vs. CTO-(1992) 84 STC 226 (WBTT), an entry in Schedule read 'Cushions, mattresses, pillows and other arti~les made from artificial or synthetic resin'. It was held that the term 'other articles' would cover only 'bedding materials'. It cannot cover 'Thermocell' made of resin, though it works as 'shock absorbent'. The 'thermocell' is used for packing and insulation and cannot be classified along with other bedding material.
In another case, the wording was 'No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall be instituted for ...'. It was held that the word 'other legal proceeding can cover only judicial or legal proceedings in Court of law as the word suit and prosecution are used only in that connection. Hence, 'other legal proceedings cannot cover departmental adjudication and appeals. Asst., Collector, C Ex, Guntur Vs. Ramdev Tobacco Company(1991) 2 SCC 119. In this case, Hon. Supreme Courrc>bserved as follows: "General words must normally bear their normal and natural and larger meaning, unless the language of statute gives a different intention, or such meaning as is likely to lead to absurd results. In such cases, their meaning can be restricted by application of rule of 'Ejusdem Generis'. But unless there is a genus which can be comprehended from the preceding words, this rule cannot be invoked. This principle is also not applicable if specific words follow general words." Further, in Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P.) Ltd. Vs. UOI-(1989) 75 STC 75 (sq Mangalore Electric Supply Co. Ltd. Vs. CIT - (1978) 113 ITR 655 (sq, and UPSEB Vs. Hari Shanker Jain-AIR 1979 SC 65, it was held that the principle must be applied with caution and not pushed too far.
In other words, the general words should be given restricted meaning only if using its normal and natural meaning gives' absurd results or language of the statute indicates that its meaning should'~«:.restricted.

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